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Who Determines the Optimal Trade-Off
Between Quality and Price?
Barbara Ann White*

I. Introduction
Two of the papers presented for these proceedings focus on
the antitrust effect (or lack thereof) of market forces on two groups of
professionals, each one possessing a high degree of expertise not
readily accessible to the consumer at large: the medical profession'
and the providers of legal education. 2 The third paper focuses on
another group of professionals possessing a high degree of expertise,
but whose expertise is not readily accessible to the public and not
brethren; that is, the
even accessible (many feel) to their professional
3
antitrust experts of the legal community.
A predominant characteristic of all three groups is what has
classically come to be known as asymmetric information. In other
words, the members of each professional group possess knowledge
critical for a layman passing judgment, but the nature of which is too
technical and specialized for the typical layman to comprehend. 4 One
*
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question pervading antitrust in the last several decades has been: How
to evaluate the regulation of professionals when cognitive
5
information about their profession is so asymmetrically distributed?
The focus of this comment is not on the typical antitrust
questions regarding regulating professionals in the face of
asymmetric information or, in particular, how to cope with the
potential anticompetitive effects of allowing the professions to
regulate themselves. That issue is explicated quite cogently and
extensively by the other commentator on this panel.6 Rather, the
purpose here is to draw attention to another problem submerged
within and yet intertwined with these discussions - the determination
of the socially optimal trade-off between quality and price in the
context of professional regulation. Co-extensively, this comment
raises the question as to what antitrust's role should be in making
such important price-quality trade-off decisions.

II. The Optimal Trade-Off Between Quality and Price
The question of the optimal trade-off between quality and
price has become increasingly important as well as complex in recent
times, as the advances of modem technology permit a far more
refined range of choices. These subtleties among choices allow an
individual, a group, or a society to titrate more precisely degrees of
quality with almost any product or service, coupled, of course, with
counterbalancing price consequences.
So for example, in the field of medicine, we can ask what
dosage do we really need of anthrax vaccine in the face of possible
anthrax attacks, what frequency of pap smears is advisable to
sufficiently reduce the risk of cervical cancer, and how many days in
the hospital, if any at all, is appropriate for any particular medical
procedure? Answering these questions involve measuring fairly
refined degrees of risk (i.e., a measure of quality of care) against the
price of reducing the risk. These questions exist more plentifully yet
starkly today because advancing technology has made more
complicated choices possible.
A similar trade-off now confronts legal education as well.
REv. 630 (1979).
5 See generally Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market
Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-best Tradeoffs,

98 MICH. L. REv. 849 (2000).
6

See generally Thomas L. Greaney, A Perfect Storm on a Sea of Doubt:

Physicians, Professionalismand Antitrust, 14 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 481 (2002).
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Questions such as the need for extensive libraries in the face of online access to legal databases, the need for classroom time in the face
of distance learning, and even the number of years necessary for a
"good" legal education given the routineness of much legal activity,
have all been raised recently as technology provides lower cost
substitutes that many argue serve as (or nearly as) well as the original
requirements. 7
When we ask such questions, whether regarding the medical
field, legal educators, the engineering profession, or any good or
service, we are asking basic questions of cost-benefit analyses. Is the
gain in quality commensurate with the additional cost? These
questions acknowledge that, by and large, increases in quality come
at a price - a higher price. Since resources are limited and society's
goods and services not boundless, these questions then translate for
each good and service into how to determine what level of quality is
optimal to achieve, given the trade-off with price. Or, as economists
would state it:
8 What level yields the optimal trade-off between price
and quality?
Traditionally for antitrust, the solution for determining the
socially optimal trade-off point is to be found by the marketplace.
Clearly, tastes and preferences among individuals differ widely so
that any one individual would make different choices. Thus there is
no unique solution. On the other hand, the field of economics has
spent decades, if not centuries, demonstrating that if the market place
is left unfettered, people acting in their own self-interest would
produce global solutions that would create "the greatest number (and
quality) of goods for the greatest number of people." 9 Antitrust law,
in general, subscribes to this means of selecting the "optimal" tradeoffs between price and quantity and/or quality.
However, reliance on the market place is premised on the
free-flow of information regarding goods, costs, and quality.
Asymmetric information problems are famously examples of one
type of market failure, when the market place cannot be relied upon

These issues, among others, are discussed in the Symposium on
Accreditation, whose proceedings were published in the Journal of Legal
Education. See 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 415, 415-56 (1995).
8 See generally Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory
of
Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. POL. EcON. 1328 (1979).
7

9 See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS:
ANALYSIS (1948).
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to yield the "socially optimal" result. People cannot act in their own
best self-interest if they do not know what they are dealing with. A
whole sub-discipline in economics studies optimal decision-making
with imperfect information." For practical purposes when it comes to
the professions, which are steeped in asymmetric information
problems, how should the assurance of quality be achieved?
Historically, society's view has been to let the "learned
professions" ensure the public of quality by allowing the professions
to regulate themselves. Clearly, this is one solution to the problem of
asymmetric information since the professionals possess the
knowledge to evaluate the conduct of their peers.12 Furthermore, in
the last century or so, as the professional groups grew in skill and
expertise, the professions certainly had strong motivations to invoke
rules and regulations to ensure some minimal quality of performance
among their members so as to avoid the profession being branded as
one of charlatans, quacks or at best, incompetent.' Thus, the
professional communities have historically not been subject to much
antitrust scrutiny.14

10

See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of

Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 941 (1963).
'" See generally John J. McCall, The Economics of Information and Optimal
Stopping Rules, 38 J. Bus. 300 (1965); Joseph L. Gastwirth, On Probabilistic
Models of Consumer Search ForInformation, 90 Q.J. ECON. 38 (1976).
12Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608, 612 (1935)
("What is generally called the 'ethics' of the profession is but the consensus of
expert opinion as to the necessity of such standards.").
13See, e.g., Semler, 294 U.S. at 612 ("The community is concerned with the
maintenance of professional standards which will insure not only competency in
individual practitioners, but protection against those who would prey upon a public
peculiarly susceptible to imposition through alluring promises of physical relief.");
Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 760 (1999) ("In order to properly serve
the public, dentists should represent themselves in a manner that contributes to the
esteem of the public.").
14Semler, 294 U.S. at 612 ("[T]he community is concerned in providing
safeguards not only against deception, but against practices which would tend to
demoralize the profession by forcing its members into an unseemly rivalry which
would enlarge the opportunities of the least scrupulous."); Goldfarb v. Va. State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975) ("It would be unrealistic to view the practice of
professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The
public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a
particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman
Act in another context, be treated differently.").
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Over the last quarter century, however, trust in the
professionals' altruistic motives regarding their self-regulation
transformed when suspicions grew that the professions were taking
advantage of their self-regulatory power. Some of the rules and
regulations emerging from different professional groups seemed to
induce more than the maintenance of what one might believe was
appropriate quality conduct. Indeed, there was an increased sense that
various professions were invoking rules and regulations that served
more to increase its members' income and other benefits, rather than
to enhance or assure quality of service to the consumer or society as a
whole. 15
The reaction to the apparent exercise of concerted power by
the professions to raise their incomes manifested itself in two ways.
One was economically, through the rise of countervailing market
forces. The other was legally, through the progeny of the Supreme
Court pronouncement in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar' that
Congress never in fact intended any "sweeping exclusion"
of
17
"learned professions" from coverage of the Sherman Act.
The market manifestations of countervailing power in the
medical profession are clear in Professor Hammer's paper, as he
describes the changing role of doctors from one of a status-based
profession to one as a distributor of medical services. The doctor's
function has been incorporated into a structure of vertical relations
and contracts as hospitals have taken over the role of organizing,
collecting and dispensing many medical services as a way of cutting
costs. We have also witnessed the rise of managed-health-care and
insurance-controlled medical decision-making, all with the view of
reducing costs of medical treatment in face of what were considered
spiraling rising medical costs. 18
Now, even the legal education profession is facing
countervailing market forces that provide lower cost legal education
by not abiding by the American Bar Association's accrediting
requirements. As another of Professor Lao's articles points out, one

15

See generally Malcolm Getz et al., Competition at the Bar: The Correlation

Between the Bar Examination Pass Rate and the Profitabilityof Practice, 67 VA.

L. REv. 863 (1981).
16

421 U.S. 773 (1975).

17

Id. at 787.

18

See generally Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient

Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market
Failure,85 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1999).
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institution, the Massachusetts School of Law, increased significantly
the use of adjunct faculty (whose salaries are a fraction of full-time
faculty's) and required full-time faculty to teach course overloads
while having fewer sabbaticals. 19 The school also included barreview courses as part of the credit curriculum while reducing plant
facilities. These all served to dramatically cut the cost of legal
education at Massachusetts School of Law to nearly half of the
average of ABA accredited law schools. Another institution, Concord
Law School, taking advantage of Internet technology, provides online legal education at about a fourth of the average cost of ABA
accredited law schools. Concord Law School, even more so than
Massachusetts Law School, is far from meeting the ABA
accreditation requirements.
Judicially, the erosion of antitrust's deference to professional
societies' self-regulatory decisions is exemplified by a series of
Supreme Court cases that scrutinized challenged professional
associations' rules and regulations on the grounds that they were
indeed anticompetitive. Goldfarb found that a state Bar's published
minimum fee recommendations for certain legal activities, coupled
with indications of disciplinary action if not conformed with, was
found to be illegal price-fixing without any examination into whether
these schedules served as "a conscientious effort to show lawyers in
their true perspective of dignity, training and integrity." 2 This
contrasts significantly with Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental
Examiners, a case 40 years earlier that upheld severe restrictions on
price and quality advertising by dentists, stating that "the community
is concerned... [with] providing safeguards... against practices which

would tend to demoralize22the profession by forcing its members into
an unseemly rivalry....'
Similar to Goldfarb, in FTC v. Indiana Federation of
Dentists23 in 1986, the Supreme Court held that the Federation's
members' concerted refusal to send their dental patients' x-rays to
insurance companies was an unreasonable restraint of trade. The

19See generally Marina Lao, DiscreditingAccreditation: Antitrust and Legal
Education, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1035 (2001).
20

421 U.S. at 787.

21

294 U.S. 608 (1935).

22

Id. at 612.

23

476 U.S. 447 (1986).

214Id. at

466.
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Court was unconvinced by the Federation's argument that the quality
of dental treatment would be compromised because evaluations of
coverage would be made by lay persons employed by the insurance
companies, 25 an argument that appears in hindsight somewhat
prophetic these days. Other cases over the years have shown the
courts' increasing emphasis on what the market effects are of rules
and regulations with respect to costs and price and a decline from
earlier positions of accepting justifications for rules based on quality
arguments.2 6
The point here is not to assert that these cases have been
decided wrongly (or rightly). Nor is it to argue that there was no need
to examine the conduct of professional associations' concerted efforts
more closely. 27 Rather, the point is to alert the antitrust community
that antitrust's increased attention on the market dynamics of various
professional restraints has a wider ramification than merely helping
the marketplace to exert its forces unfettered. It still is the case that
professional services are steeped in asymmetric information
problems; this means that focusing solely on removing piecemeal
impediments to market dynamics may not lead to the optimal tradeoff between quality and price that society might wish to choose.
Antitrust decisions have impacts broader than merely
promoting market-force results on the allocation of society's
resources. The resulting allocation of resources is determined not just
by the marketplace itself, but more importantly by how resources are
distributed initially. In other words, the outcome of any market
process is constrained by who owns the resources at the start.
Asymmetric information problems are a cause for concern because
information is "privately" owned and it is distributed unevenly. Who
gets to exert the use of that power will affect what levels and types of
quality will be deemed optimal in the quality-price trade-off.
The question then is: Who do we want to make the decision of
what is socially optimal when relying on the marketplace itself does
not assure the usual measure of social optimality? In the case of
medical services, do we want doctors, lawyers, or insurance
companies making the decision? In the case of legal education, do we
want legal educators, the professional association of lawyers (i.e., the
ABA), or a common denominator determined by costs and profits

25

id. at 461-463.

26 See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978);
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (1993); Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 760.
27 See generally Greaney, supra note 6.
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based on the goal of passing a state's bar exam to make the decision?
Each group has their own criteria for determining what constitutes the
optimal choice, any set of which has its merits and drawbacks.
Whose influence do we want to dominate? Do we want to allow for a
mix - an interaction among the competing forces?

III.

Asymmetric Information and Antitrust Market
Analysis

When antitrust makes a decision about permissible and
impermissible restraints, it is making a decision about allocating the
power to decide. When problems such as asymmetric information are
not present, as stated earlier, the typical antitrust approach to let the
"market" decide is a valid approach. But when problems such as
asymmetric information are present - leading to what is known as
"market failure" - then it behooves antitrust analysis to go beyond
mere market restraint analysis. It needs to examine the consequences
of the choice of power its decision makes. This is something antitrust
decisions rarely do. This is a criteria that antitrust needs to consider
with the onslaught of increasing information and the concomitant
asymmetric distribution of it.
Market analyses of the antitrust impact of various restraints in
general are already quite complex. For every restraint examined, one
can always offer arguments asserting the restraint's pro-competitive
effect as well as its anti-competitive consequences. Sorting through
which argument should be persuasive is the inherent burden that is
antitrust's.
In the context of asymmetric information regarding quality,
however, sorting through the arguments regarding pro- and anticompetitive effects becomes even more complicated. Generally, the
most commonly agreed upon criteria for judging whether a restraint
unduly restricts trade is whether it unduly constrains supply so as to
raise price. Of course, the litigated issues are what constitutes
"unduly."
The complication that asymmetric information creates in the
context of regulating the quality of professionals is that raising or
maintaining quality inherently restricts entry into the profession (and

28

See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); Cal.

Dental, 526 U.S. at 777 ("[I]t is of course the producers' supply of a good in
relation to demand that is normally relevant in determining whether a producerimposed output limitation has the anticompetitive effect of artificially raising
prices.").
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thereby the supply of services) and therefore, of necessity, causes a
rise in the price of (or fees for) those services. Not only do the higher
quality standards exclude lesser-qualified individuals, but the higher
fees generated thereby mean higher income for the providers of the
service and induce better qualified individuals to choose that
profession. Thus, the higher the quality standards, the more
restriction on the supply and the higher the fees paid for the services
supplied. One must ask: How high should that standard be?
Choosing that standard of quality is the underlying struggle in
determining the optimal trade-off between quality and price.
Furthermore, the importance of choosing that standard also makes the
traditional antitrust examination of rules and regulations - based
merely on their restrictions to supply that increase price - too
parochial.

IV. Conclusion
Perhaps it is true that the deference antitrust paid to the expert
opinion of the professions was once too great or became
anachronistic as the commercial aspects of the professions grew over
time. But moving to the other extreme of merely scrutinizing for
traditional restraints of trade may be unsuitably narrow in perspective
as well.
The overt theme in the first two articles, Professor Hammer's
and Professor Lao's, is the impact market forces have had on the
professions they examine in recent times, considered in the context of
antitrust decisions. The third article, Professor Calkins', gives a view
of the antitrust legal profession's own use of the marketplace - "the
marketplace of ideas" - through the use of professional meetings to
exchange perspectives and form opinions to influence further
developments in antitrust law. Perhaps in that marketplace of ideas
we can consider possible solutions to this dilemma. Perhaps it is time
for antitrust to develop more sophisticated criteria for judging
professional regulations than merely choosing between deference to
the profession's quality arguments or examining the regulation's
restraint on market forces.

